EXPERIENCE.

EXPERIENCE belongs to the class of those concepts which at first sight appear simple, and yet in the course of philosophical development give rise to much inquiry. To emphasize the truth of this assertion it is only necessary to refer to the succession of philosophers in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, to Bacon, Locke, Hume, Leibnitz, Kant. At the present day we have not yet, by any means, attained a full comprehension of this concept, and the attempt to gain clearer knowledge on this point is well worth the effort. The present paper presupposes the former article in this REVIEW[1] to the extent that it takes for granted the position that consciousness, in the sense of a universal determination, demands as a condition of its possibility a particular individual whose *being* is itself consciousness, and thus necessarily implies a concrete consciousness. As a matter of fact, a consciousness-individual has been tacitly assumed in all discussions relating to experience. More particularly, this consciousness alone has thereby been regarded as the *objective*, or, what is the same thing, the *theoretical* consciousness, since this as logical subject has consciousness of something which is just the logical object. We can find this tacit assumption even in the writings of those who, in the course of their inquiry, imagine that they are forced to deny that the possibility of the existence of this consciousness-individual can be scientifically established. For instance, in Hume's description of experience as 'impression' the existence of a consciousness-individual in the background can be distinctly discerned, and the same is true of those German philosophers who agree with Hume and use the expression *Empfindung*.

This introduces the question in regard to the general sense of the term 'experience,' which, as something accepted by

[1] September, 1897.

every one, may serve as a starting-point for investigation. Whenever the word is used, an objective consciousness is presupposed which is capable of being affected or of receiving impressions; we speak of experience only when an objective consciousness is affected. Experience is, therefore, a determination of objective consciousness, and has as the condition of its possibility something capable of affecting this objective consciousness. 'Experience' is another expression for the objective element in consciousness which is conditioned by impression (*Affection*), and through its origin is differentiated in a purely psychological way from the other objective aspects which depend, not on immediate impression from without, but on the reproduction and combination of objective elements. The ordinary meaning of the term is, as one may see, a psychological growth. In its usual acceptation, experience seems to signify what we are wont to call 'perception,' or, at times, 'sensation'; while, as objective determination of consciousness, it stands contrasted with other objective elements which we call 'idea' and their combinations.[1]

In ordinary speech, however, this psychological sense of the word constitutes but a groundwork, as it were. There is always a superstructure in the form of a logical or epistemological meaning. This element is most prominently in the foreground whenever we talk of 'experience,' and through it the conception is gained that, on the ground of the causal relation between that what affects the objective consciousness and the experience of this consciousness, there exists a cognitive relation (*Erkenntnisbeziehung*) between this experience and the cause of the impression. When we first reflect on the matter from an epistemological point of view, the psychological impression on *objective* consciousness appears as an objective 'having' (*gegenständliches haben*) of the affecting agency on the part of the consciousness which is affected. That is, it appears as a knowledge on the part of the soul of that which affects it. In other words, it seems at first that it is characteristic of this state in which consciousness, so far as it is objective, is affected

[1] Cf. *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie*, §§ 22, 30, 47.

that the individual has a consciousness of that which affects him, *i.e.*, has experience in psychological and logical sense.

If one starts from the concept of experience, it is true that its scope is in a general way determined by the notion of affecting agency as such, but the extent of its scope may yet give room for dispute. Does the range of experience coincide with that of being as such, or is the former only a part or section of the latter? This question, which implies the possibility that not everything which exists becomes the content of an experience, is prompted by the fact that the particular objective consciousness can have as content that which is not given by impression, at least, directly. Apart from this, the question would not arise for us. How much is objective in our consciousness the possession of which, so far as we are concerned, is not based upon direct impressions! For example, what I have been told about New York is for me objective ideation, although I have not myself 'experienced' it. This power of ideating something objective apart from any 'perception' of the object by means of an impression, is the real presupposition which renders generally plausible at first sight the separation of the domain of experience from that of being. It also causes this separation to be maintained, even when it has been pointed out that the objective knowledge which others communicate to us, enters consciousness by direct impression, and is thus content of experience.

Thus, from our earliest youth, the distinction between experience and being is perfectly familiar, and it is only through later reflection that we come to be somewhat in doubt about it. This distinction is further supported by the fact that, apart from what is related to us by others, we become conscious of being, without the aid of immediate impression, by a process of definite reasoning. We infer from tracks in the sand or snow that an animal has passed a particular place; we reason from sounds to individuals, etc. Even when, in these cases likewise, it is proved that the possibility of drawing these conclusions presupposes definite experiences on our part, we usually still hold fast to the absolute distinction between experience

and being, a distinction which is based first on the view that the objective element in consciousness is given partly through impression and partly otherwise, and secondly on an identification of the real (*Seiendes*) in experience with that which is given through impression.

Since it appears, however, that what becomes objective for us through the reports of others depends upon the experience of others, and in the last resort also upon our own, and, further, that our capacity for drawing conclusions in certain cases is likewise rendered possible by our own experience, it is evident that other arguments must be found to maintain the distinction between experience and being, and to disprove the view that the two coincide, or, in other words, that all that exists is *capable* of affecting us and becoming the content of some experience. These arguments must naturally be based on facts, on the immediately given. It will therefore be necessary to indicate something of which we are all conscious, but which, on the one hand, is not given through impression, and, on the other, is unquestionably 'being.'

The pure empiricist adopts the position that everything which is given, consequently everything that is content of consciousness, arises either through impression or on the basis of what is given through impression, and thus is either perception or idea. He therefore regards being and experience, or, rather, being and possible experience, as concepts that are coextensive, and so would always maintain that it is impossible to indicate the existence of something which is a conscious given and yet is neither indirectly nor directly due to impression. If an opponent points to the consciousness of self, to the consciousness of perceiving, ideating, feeling, desiring, and willing, as instances of consciousness unmediated by impression, he retorts that this consciousness of the soul and its operations only exists because the soul has been in some way affected. In this way, the empiricist comes to divide experience, after the analogy of the division of being, into self and outer world, into inner and outer experience, or into inner and outer perception.

This division, however, is only justified on one presupposition, and stands or falls with its justification. This assumption concerns the soul, and is to the effect that the *being* of the soul is not consciousness. It implies, accordingly, that 'soul' and 'consciousness' are not terms with the same meaning, but rather that consciousness is simply a particular determination which only appears when the soul is affected. In my first article in this magazine,[1] and in my *Psychology*,[2] I have fully discussed the contradiction which is involved in the assertion that consciousness is a particular determination of the soul, and have also shown the impossibility of regarding the soul as anything else than consciousness. At present I shall only direct attention to the extraordinary conclusions which follow from this concept of *inner* experience. In this conception another is necessarily involved, namely, that the soul affects itself, and through this action on itself becomes conscious of itself. We admit that those who view the soul, not as concrete consciousness, but as some inexplicable sort of a 'thing,' perhaps unconscious, or as an unknown x, are compelled by the undeniable fact of self-consciousness to seize upon the remarkable word 'self-impression' (*Selbst-Affection*) if they desire to make a passable rhyme with 'self-consciousness.' But what meaning does the term convey? Since impression is a notion gained from experience, we understand it to imply of necessity two factors, that which affects and that which is affected. It is true that we can say of a thing that it 'affects itself'; for instance, that the snake bites itself on the tail, or that the scorpion by bending itself backward stings itself. But in truth it is one thing, the jaws or sting, which affects another thing, the tail or back. In the strict sense of the words, one thing never affects itself; impression always implies two things.

Since the fact of self-consciousness on the part of the soul cannot be denied, the attempt has been to picture it, somewhat on the analogy of the bending backwards of the snake or scorpion. The attempt must, however, be unavailing, since the fact on which the analogy rests has itself no firm

[1] September, 1897. [2] § 14.

foundation. As we have just shown, the so-called 'self-impression' is really impression of one thing by another.

Usually when these considerations are urged, the supporters of the point of view under discussion content themselves with the claim that, while the notion of self-impression certainly cannot be made clear, it must yet be assumed in order to give a meaning to inner perception or inner experience, and to render intelligible the soul's consciousness of itself. We must, however, advise those who thus cling to the unintelligible that, before they flee to the refuge of ignorance, they ought once more to reconsider their fundamental conception of the soul, and inquire whether, after all, it is not superfluous for an understanding of self-consciousness to maintain the existence of self-impression and inner experience. We are convinced that they will come to believe that they have misunderstood the nature of the soul, and have in consequence of this been compelled to adopt the remarkable conception of self-impression.

If we recognize that the soul is consciousness and nothing else, we shall be able to understand how it is possible for the soul to have experience (*i.e.*, to have consciousness of something else through being affected by this other). At the same time it will be clear how it can be conscious of itself and its operations. This latter consciousness can certainly not be regarded as *experience*, since 'self-impression' is a meaningless expression. It is, rather, something unmediated as a conscious given, for to have consciousness of itself and its life is involved in the being of consciousness as a necessary moment of itself.[1]

Hence, altogether apart from the absurdity of the term 'self-impression,' the fact that the soul is consciousness rules out the concept of inner experience, for the reason that the soul as consciousness possesses in its own right that which it is supposed to derive from inner experience, namely, the consciousness of what it contains. Inner 'experience' and inner 'perception' (if perception be supposed to involve impression) are thus already condemned by the view that the soul is con-

[1] Cf. *Psychologie*, pp. 130, 153 ff.

sciousness. Experience and perception play a part only when the soul is affected by something else. For this reason, also, experience contains only that which belongs to the objective consciousness as a particular modification of its determination. If there were such a thing as inner experience, the term 'experience' would be applicable to all that belongs to consciousness as existence and as cause,[1] namely, the consciousness of feeling, desire, and will. But we know that the consciousness of our present states of feeling, desiring, and willing is something immediate, and does not appear only when impression has played its part.

Locke, who set up the division of experience into inner and outer, yet, to a certain extent, admitted the facts which oppose this division and support with sufficient emphasis the view that the soul has an immediate consciousness of itself. For, as epistemologist, he declared that inner experience affords an adequate knowledge of that which then affects the soul, namely, the soul itself; while outer experience involves no such knowledge of the affecting agency. How could he have justified the different evaluation of his two forms of experience if he had not tacitly (and inconsistently) assumed the fact which the term 'inner experience' assuredly obscures, namely, that the soul as conscious being has an immediate consciousness of its own life. Kant, it is true, avoided Locke's inconsistency, although he adopted the Lockian division of experience. He maintained consistency, however, by ascribing to both a merely phenomenal, epistemological value, and thus ignored the fact of the immediate consciousness on the part of the soul of its own life.

If we are compelled to believe that experience, as universally understood, implies something that affects consciousness, as well as a consciousness that is affected, and, accordingly, that self-impression and its implicate 'inner experience' are alike impossible, it follows that the term 'inner sense' is also absurd when it is used to indicate something, in contradistinction to matter of fact, which may be called 'outer sense.' *The illusion*

[1] Was dem zuständlichen und ursächlichen Bewusstsein zugehört.

of an 'inner sense' is closely bound up with the illusion of an 'inner experience.'

What is called the sensibility of the receptive consciousness can thus only concern that objective element of consciousness which is objective as a result of impression due to an external agency. 'Sense' can, therefore, be applicable only to what our opponents call 'outer experience,' but what we call experience simply, since the content of consciousness which they call 'inner experience' is, as a matter of fact, the immediate property of consciousness, and, therefore, not in any sense experience. If one always remembers that the soul which is affected is consciousness and nothing else, one will regard the objective element of consciousness which is due to impression, *i.e.*, experience, as limited to the objective element which is mediated by sense and, consequently, as confined to what we are wont to call 'the perceived outer world.' Every application of the concept 'experience' to any other content of consciousness, can be shown to rest on an error, namely, on a departure from the conception of the soul as consciousness-individual.

Although the concept of experience is limited to the objective element in consciousness which we call the perceived outer world, and although experience in consequence is simply the objective consciousness mediated by sense, yet the latter is not less immediately given than the consciousness of the soul and its life, and, as such, we call it *perception* in distinction from *idea*.

Starting from the standpoint of those who uncritically imagine that in experience we are aware of the 'other' which affects us as it is, we showed that those who adopted this position could only escape admitting that experience and being correspond, by proving the existence of an objective consciousness not derived from experience, and yet as 'conscious' corresponding to something that exists. It is true that the possibility of this will be disputed by the pure empiricist, but, as we have shown, this is done illegitimately, for the soul's consciousness of itself and its life, which the empiricist would reduce to an assumed self-impression, and thus to a form of experience, is precisely that

which gives the upholders of the other point of view some ground for refusing to make experience and being coincide, at least, entirely. This consciousness is, not less than perception, immediately given, but from the psychological point of view it seems to be a special kind of conscious content, opposed to experience as far as it is unmediated, while the latter is mediated by something. From the epistemological point of view, again, another difference appears, namely, that while the soul, in the immediate consciousness of itself and its life, without question knows this being, which is called 'soul' and 'soul-life,' precisely as it is; on the other hand, in regard to experience, the doubt arises at once as to whether the agency which affects us comes to consciousness *as it is*. Since the time of Augustine, and more emphatically since the time of Descartes, the certainty which attaches to the soul's consciousness of itself has been brought to light. And if Kant, nevertheless, doubted and even denied this, it was only because he regarded the soul's consciousness of itself and its life as an experience, and therefore explained it as a result of self-impression.

The soul's immediate consciousness of itself is an indisputable fact. This fact justifies the refusal to make experience coincide with being, so long of course as it is admitted that being as knowledge may be the content of experience; and it compels us to regard being as the wider notion in which the self, which is immediately given to itself, must certainly be included.

We have now determined the meaning of 'experience' from the psychological point of view, and found that experience in this sense may be defined as the immediate objective conscious content of the soul, which is mediated by impression on the part of an 'other.' Before we enter upon an inquiry into the epistemological meaning of the term, we must briefly discuss the possibility of experience, *i.e.*, the possibility of our consciousness being affected. We remain here at the psychological point of view, which presupposes the existence of something distinct from the soul, namely, a world of things to which the human body also belongs.

The question whether things can influence consciousness or the soul, is commonly answered in the negative. It is maintained that interaction can only take place between individuals which are of a similar nature, at least so far as regards their most fundamental determinations; and, consequently, that things cannot produce an effect on consciousness, since the two individuals in question are absolutely different. But 'to produce an effect' in its widest sense means to be the condition of a change in an individual; what sort of a condition this is, must be determined by the facts alone, and not by the particular nature of the individuals concerned. If it is found, therefore, that for a change in consciousness there can be no other condition than a physical change, there is nothing in the general notion of cause to prevent us from regarding the bodily state as the condition of the change in consciousness, although it is totally different from the latter. We do not, therefore, come into conflict with the general concept of cause, when we declare that consciousness can be affected by something else, even when this is an absolute 'other.'

It is more difficult, however, to determine the epistemological meaning of experience, *i.e.*, the objective element of our consciousness which is given through impression by something external. While it is easy to understand that the soul, just because it is consciousness, is aware of itself as it is, in regard to experience the question soon arises whether the soul, in the objective consciousness which is due to impression, really is aware of the affecting agency itself, as we at first sight commonly suppose. The history of the discussion of the question whether experience affords a knowledge of something outside of the soul, and the soul in consequence is aware of that affecting agency as it is, shows how much doubt arises as to the validity of an affirmative answer to this question. If the objective consciousness, as it is contained in experience, amounts to the soul's possession of an 'other,' it is necessary to make clear what this is. This becomes the more difficult, the less one thinks at the start of the absolute difference between this 'other,' the material 'thing' of the outer world, and conscious-

ness or the soul, and the more one is inclined to regard the soul rather as a particular kind of thing, and therefore to class it among the things of the external world.

The conception of the soul as a consciousness-thing brings in its train that endless painful struggle, which the history of epistemology discloses, to harmonize two apparently irreconcilable conceptions, viz., that the soul is a thing *separated off* from the things of the external world, and that as consciousness-thing it possesses in experience the things themselves of the outer world, and accordingly has them 'within itself.'

That external things themselves in some way pass over into the soul may well seem a rather daring conception, though it seems to us to be the only one which fully explains the view that the soul, as consciousness-thing, in experience takes up into itself the things of the external world. Against the acceptance of this position, however, stands the fact that the external things apparently do not alter their position when they are perceived, but remain outside the soul, where by hypothesis they were before the experience took place. Thus it happens that the attempt is made to explain this 'having' of the thing on the part of the experiencing soul, by the supposition that in experience there is in the soul a perfect copy, or reflected image, of the external things. Bacon contented himself with this view of experience, though long before his time its validity had with good ground been disputed. Indeed, it is not easy to understand how this theory of experience could long be maintained. There are two facts which destroy it effectually and inevitably. The first is that the hypothetical thing-image of experience manifests certain 'qualities' which evidently can belong only to an experienced fact, and not to an external thing. This was discovered as early as the time of Democritus, and was later emphasized by Descartes and also by Locke (in the distinction between primary and secondary qualities). The second fact is the impossibility of proving that the objective consciousness, given in experience by means of impression, is an *image* of the external thing. This is fatal also to the contention, which was certainly put forward as a reply to the first difficulty in the time

of Democritus and presumably later, that the objective consciousness, so far as it relates to the primary qualities or space relations of a thing, is nevertheless a reflected image of the latter. For it can be asserted that something is an image, only if comparison is possible between it and the original of which it is said to be a copy; and this implies that the original is likewise given. But the possibility of this comparison is ruled out in our own case, because even from the point of view we are criticising there is present to the soul merely its objective consciousness, *i.e.*, the hypothetical reflected image of the thing, and not the external thing itself. And if the thing itself were somehow present in our objective consciousness, it would be directly possessed, and the 'image' would be wholly superfluous. It is not necessary to the explanation of experience if the latter is the conscious possession of the external thing; and, further, according to hypothesis, no place can be found for it alongside of the external things, since these are immediately known and directly possessed.

With the destruction of the image theory of experience the epistemological signification of experience seems to disappear, at least if one adheres to the presupposition that the consciousness which is affected, and thus has experience in the psychological sense, is a consciousness-thing *absolutely* detached from the things of the external world, so that the objective experience due to impression must be thought of as enclosed *in* this consciousness-thing as its 'content.' For, in that case, there is no possibility of establishing an epistemological relation between the experience content, thus shut up, and the outside agency which affects the consciousness-thing. And why does this impossibility exist? Not because the objective consciousness, which may be called 'experience' in the psychological sense, is not clearly presented, but because the hypothetical thing which gives rise to impression from outside *is not presented at all.* For then we must ask what right we have to assume the existence of such an agency outside of us, in order to explain the objective consciousness called 'experience.' And, from the standpoint in question, the answer must be that there

is not the slightest justification for this assumption, and, consequently, that we cannot with any pretension to scientific accuracy speak of things external to us. The result of this would be that the objective consciousness could not be called 'experience,' even in a psychological sense. If there are no external things, we cannot any longer talk of an impression of consciousness by means of things outside of us. This is, in truth, the final outcome of the position that the soul is a consciousness-thing among other things. But when it appears that these epistemologists have no right to assume the existence of external things, how does it happen that they have always assumed the existence of an external world and thus possess the notion of externality?

This question brings us to the root of the whole problem of epistemology. Up to the present we have followed out that view which Berkeley consistently maintained, namely, that as the soul is consciousness-thing and therefore individual, anything that may exist external to it must be absolutely separated from it, and its objective consciousness must be enclosed *in* itself, altogether divorced from the external world, if that exist. If any one, like Berkeley, consistently excludes the independently existing external things hitherto assumed; regards consciousness-things, *i.e.*, spirits, as the only individuals capable of separate existence on their own account, and for that reason explains the other thing-individuals commonly assumed as simply forms of the objective consciousness in individuals — he can only retain the notion of experience as objective consciousness in the soul rendered possible by impression, if he admits that the soul can be affected by another consciousness-thing. This is the position adopted by Berkeley, though he ascribes this power of impression, not to every spirit, but to the divine spirit alone. It is true that the justification of this limitation is not obvious, but the supposition of the existence of independently existing consciousness-things nevertheless gave Berkeley the right to use the concept of experience in the psychological sense, for he still admitted the existence of something external to the soul, namely, consciousness-thing or

spirit. Even this, however, is open to serious objections. In the first place, the epistemological meaning of experience, originally assumed, is irretrievably lost. Even if the objective consciousness of that which affects the soul, *i.e.*, experience in its psychological sense, could be assumed to be identical with some objective element in the divine consciousness, and could also, though it is also objective consciousness to the divine spirit, pass for something which is external to the soul which is affected—even if a place could be found for these two elements of experience as we originally understand it, the third postulate which is necessarily involved in the concept of experience is still lacking, namely, that what is epistemologically identical with the objective consciousness of the soul which is affected should be also the affecting agency itself existing outside of it. For Berkeley, however, this agency which gives rise to impression is God, not the objective consciousness (idea) in God. He thus loses the right to speak of experience in an epistemological sense, for from his standpoint the reality of the world of external things, *i.e.*, its causal efficacy or power of causing impression, can no longer be maintained. The external things are outside of the soul, it is true, but only exist as ideas in the mind of God. Moreover, there is no proof of the *identity* of the objective consciousness in God with the consciousness which is assumed to be due to the divine agency; and no proof is possible, since a comparison between the two cannot be made by the soul. Further, the assumption of the existence of other consciousness-things is wholly unjustifiable, because the soul as consciousness-thing can only affirm the existence of itself and what it contains, *i.e.*, its own ideas. There remains also for Berkeley, and those who adopt his position, the insoluble riddle that the soul yet has the notion of something external to itself. How can the possession of this concept be explained from the Berkeleian standpoint?

We now proceed to the solution of this difficulty. The usual reply is that consciousness (which is still viewed as a species of 'thing') projects to something *outside of itself* the objective consciousness which arises *originally in itself*, by instinct

(Hume) or in obedience to the causal impulse (Schopenhauer). This, however, can only satisfy those who already tacitly presuppose the existence of an external world, whether it be a world of material things or of spirits regarded as consciousness-things. It is not a justifiable assumption on the part of those who assert that the objective consciousness is originally contained in the soul as consciousness-thing, and comes to consciousness originally as such. If the immediately given objective consciousness is at the outset always shut up *in the soul*, it does not seem possible for the soul to derive from this any consciousness of what is external to it. No thing, and, therefore, no consciousness regarded as a thing, can be supposed capable of going out of itself. In other words, no thing can contain *in itself* something which at the same time exists on its own account apart from it. A consciousness-thing must forever remain hopelessly shut up within the circle of its own objective ideas; it could never become aware of anything 'external,' or even know that anything of the sort existed. It is true that the concept of cause which consciousness possesses, has been employed to explain the soul's awareness of an external world. The soul, it is said, finds itself compelled to seek an external cause for its objective consciousness. This explanation must be a failure, however, for it *presupposes* that the consciousness which reasons and infers, possesses the notion of something external. How could the soul infer that something outside of itself existed, if it did not bear within itself the general notion of externality?

So long as one proceeds on the assumption that the soul is a particular thing, which has, in consequence, an existence altogether detached from, and in opposition to, a possible external world, all subsequent reflection on the problem of experience must lead ultimately to the denial of the possibility of experience as such. Solipsism would in that case be the last word of wisdom, as it is already the undoubted consequence of the assumption that the soul is, as existence, absolutely separated from the individuals composing the external world. Leibnitz, by his assumption of 'windowless ideating monads,' did not

land in solipsism, for by means of his doctrine of 'preëstablished harmony' he attempted to retain, not the fact of experience on the part of the monads, it is true, but the positing of an outer world in the shape of other monads. Thereby, however, he gave emphatic expression to the belief that must always be tacitly involved in the notion of the detached individual soul, namely, that outside of the soul an 'other' exists. Thus in solipsism itself is involved the conception which destroys it, *i.e.*, the notion of something external to the soul.

Solipsism, however, contains the truth that the soul as consciousness can only affirm and judge in regard to what exists in its consciousness. But this truth leads us to recognize the fact that the line of thought on which the soul is regarded as one individual absolutely separated from others external to it, can be nothing else than solipsism. It seems to me that solipsism can only be avoided, if the erroneous doctrine that the soul is a consciousness-thing is exchanged for the true view that the soul is an individual which, as consciousness, is aware of itself and others, and distinguishes itself at the same time from others.

It belongs essentially to the nature of consciousness to be objective; consciousness that is not also objective consciousness, is unthinkable and impossible. But, as consciousness has also at the same time an existential (*zuständliches*) aspect, we have thus a distinction between consciousness as objective and as subjective existence, or between consciousness as belonging to self and as referring to others. The objective is that which refers to others; the subjective is that which belongs to self, and implies that consciousness, as a particular, differentiates and distinguishes itself from its objectivity. Like the subjective and objective aspects, consciousness as belonging to self and consciousness as relating to others are from the beginning united. The one is the necessary complement of the other. Self-consciousness is thus impossible without a consciousness on the part of the soul of some 'other.'

The fact that consciousness is objective, *i.e.*, involves an awareness of an 'other,' like the fact that consciousness implies

a knowledge of itself as a particular, is a primary fact which can be as little doubted, denied, or ignored as the existence of self-consciousness. Every attempt to deny it shows, as we have indicated in connection with solipsism, that the awareness of an 'other' is tacitly implied as the accompaniment of the awareness of self as a particular.

In view of this fundamental certainty, to question our right as particulars to speak of anything other than ourselves, is as absurd as to doubt our right to speak of ourselves as particulars. Such a question will only seem justifiable to one who views the soul as a thing, and thus makes it an individual which is absolutely separated from others. But if we keep to the true concept of consciousness, and therefore regard the soul as an individual which differentiates itself from others, and can and must be aware of others, the trouble which would otherwise be occasioned by the fact that the soul is aware of an 'other,' is at an end. For the recognition of the fact that to belong to a consciousness is not the same as to belong to a thing, obviates the difficulty.[1] But the objectivity of consciousness again involves a contradiction in regard to the sense in which the objective belongs to us, for one part of it can only be rightly viewed as 'other,' while at the same time it is regarded as belonging to our consciousness; whereas another part is objective and can be thought of without being regarded as a possession of our consciousness. The first-mentioned species of objective consciousness constitutes, along with feeling, desire, and will, the so-called 'inner world' of the soul; the second forms its *outer world*. The one falls under the concept of subjectivity, the other constitutes the objective for the particular consciousness.

On the latter now depends the problem of experience, since the objective in this case is that conscious given which can be thought of apart from its relation to a particular consciousness. In other words, it is the something outside of the soul, *i.e.*, existence without reference to a particular consciousness, that can affect the particular consciousness to which, as real, it

[1] *Psychologie*, pp. 81 ff.

is opposed. The possibility of experience, *i.e.*, of the impression of the soul by means of something else, is hereby established: if there is some 'other' which exists apart from us, it can produce effects upon us. Whether that which is given as objective to the particular consciousness by means of this experience is objective—*i.e.*, is identical with the 'other' which affects consciousness — *is a question which obviously cannot be solved by experience.* Even if it is impossible to doubt that the soul by experience gains knowledge of the real outside of it, *i.e.*, that which exists independently of it, yet the truth of this knowledge is not so self-evident as the truth of the consciousness of itself and of the 'other' which the soul as consciousness possesses. Rather, this truth still requires to be justified and established, and this justification is necessarily *logical* (epistemological). But even if experience involves a knowledge of the objective on the part of the particular consciousness, the problem of experience is nevertheless *not epistemological, but purely psychological.*

Experience throws no light upon the concept of Objectivity or Reality; rather, the latter alone enables us to understand the former and comprehend its possibility. Through experience, however, the soul comes into possession of the objective and real, and thus passes beyond itself.

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